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The seventh of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code’s nine “rules of construction” 
seems straightforward enough: “the singular includes the plural.” But 
bankruptcy judges across the country have, in a surprisingly varied range of 
contexts, struggled with whether strict obedience to the language of § 102(7) 
reflects the congressional intent underlying the particular provision being 
interpreted. Previously, judicial confusion as to proper application of  
§ 102(5) (“‘or’ is not exclusive”) had to be resolved by the U.S. Supreme 
Court. The situation calls for some manner of revision to the Code’s 
statutory-analysis “rules.” This note first provides a history of the so-called 
“canons” of construction before turning to the commonly used number-
neutrality canons and explaining how an incomplete reformulation of it 
was codified within the Code of 1978. Next, this note highlights instances 
in which strict, as opposed to relaxed, adherence to § 102(5) and § 102(7) 
has led to conflicting results in disputes stemming from certain Code 
provisions, including § 522(d)(11)(D) (exemption for “a payment  .  .  . on 
account of personal bodily injury”) and § 548(a)(2)(A) (fraudulent-transfer 
exception for “a charitable contribution to a qualified . . . entity”). Third, 
this note explores the practical implications of the conflicting approaches to  
§ 102(7). Finally, this note proposes solutions for resolving the statutory-
analysis problems resulting from § 102, an undertaking that would in turn 
promote increased clarity in a statutory framework that is regarded by some 
as plagued by imprecise language.
i. intrOdUCtiOn
 For Anthony Phillips of Elmont, New York,1 the 2010s had gotten off to a rocky 
start. On the morning of August 11, 2010, Phillips was driving his Chevrolet along 
a roadway in Hempstead, New York, when he was involved in a crash with another 
vehicle.2 On June 5, 2011, Phillips was driving on the east side of Manhattan, near 
the entrance to the Queensboro Bridge, when he was involved in another car 
accident—this time with a taxi cab.3 In August 2011, Phillips filed separate personal 
injury actions against the drivers in those accidents; he alleged in each complaint 
that he had incurred serious bodily injury as a result of the collision.4
 On April 12, 2012, Phillips, a retired member of the New York City Police 
Department, filed for bankruptcy protection in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the 
1. See Voluntary Petition at 1, In re Phillips, 485 B.R. 53 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2012) (No. 12-72379-ast) 
[hereinafter Phillips Petition] (listing Anthony Phillips’s home address).
2. See Summons and Complaint at 3, Phillips v. Armand, No. 20281/11 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Queens Cnty. Aug. 
15, 2011) [hereinafter Armand Complaint].
3. See Summons and Verified Complaint at 3, Phillips v. Tiki Cab Corp., No. 22833/11 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
Queens Cnty. Aug. 30, 2011) [hereinafter Tiki Cab Complaint].
4. See Armand Complaint, supra note 2, at 3–4; Tiki Cab Complaint, supra note 3, at 4.
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Eastern District of New York.5 He and his wife, April, stated in their voluntary 
Chapter 7 petition that they had less than three hundred dollars in their various 
bank accounts, and that they owed more than five hundred thousand dollars on a 
home in which they had an equitable stake of roughly half that amount.6
 If the relative proximity of these unfortunate events afforded any silver lining for 
Phillips, it was that the language of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code (“the Code”) seemed 
to permit individual debtors to place out of creditors’ reach a sizable chunk of 
whatever money they expected to recover as a result of pending personal injury 
actions listed as assets in their bankruptcy petitions. Section 522(d)(11)(D) of the 
Code states that a bankruptcy debtor may exempt the right to receive  “a payment, 
not to exceed [a fixed amount of money adjusted for inflation, which was $21,625 in 
2012], on account of personal bodily injury.”7 Of further apparent benefit to Phillips 
was § 102(7)—one of the Code’s “rules of construction”—which provides that “[i]n 
this title . . . the singular includes the plural.”8 Phillips, anticipating that each of his 
motor vehicle lawsuits would result in recovery of damages in excess of the amount 
listed in § 522(d)(11)(D), claimed two personal injury action exemptions in his 
bankruptcy petition for a total of $43,250.9
 Phillips and his bankruptcy attorney undoubtedly assumed that they were on 
solid legal footing in seeking exemptions for twice the amount specifically set forth 
in § 522(d)(11)(D); bankruptcy courts in Connecticut, Texas, and Pennsylvania had 
previously permitted individual debtors to claim personal injury action exemptions in 
this fashion.10 But when the trustee in Phillips and his wife’s bankruptcy action 
challenged the extent of Phillips’s § 522(d)(11)(D) exemptions, a Long Island-based 
bankruptcy judge ruled that Phillips should be limited to a maximum exemption of 
$21,625.11 The judge reasoned that when the rule of construction codified in § 
102(7) is applied to the language of § 522(d)(11)(D), it becomes clear that the Code 
prohibits a debtor in Phillips’s position from claiming more than the amount listed in 
§ 522(d)(11)(D), irrespective of the number of injury-causing events in which he had 
been involved in the months and years leading up to his bankruptcy petition.12
 Though perhaps uncomplicated at first glance, § 102(7) has caused no shortage 
of confusion for debtors, attorneys, and judges involved in bankruptcy litigation in 
U.S. courts, who remain uncertain as to the extent to which this codified canon 
5. See Phillips Petition, supra note 1, sched. I.
6. See id. scheds. C–D.
7. 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(11)(D) (2013). As of the date of publication, the personal injury exemption amount 
stands at $22,975. 11 U.S.C.A. § 522(d)(11)(D) (West 2015).
8. 11 U.S.C. § 102(7).
9. See Phillips Petition, supra note 1, sched. C.
10. See discussion infra Part III.B.3 (discussing courts’ differing approaches to § 522(d)(11)(D)).
11. See In re Phillips, 485 B.R. 53, 62 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2012).
12. See id. at 57 (“The grammatical structure of § 522(d)(11)(D), therefore, requires the monetary cap ‘not 
to exceed $21,625’ to apply with equal force to either one or multiple payment(s) and regardless of how 
many injuries the debtor suffered.”). 
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should—or should not—be applied in particular bankruptcy-related scenarios.13 As a 
result, § 102(7) has featured prominently in contexts as varied as disputes over wage 
garnishments affecting individual debtors14 and challenges to reorganization plans 
for major corporations.15 The unresolved questions regarding the extent to which § 
102(7) should be followed have led to conf licting results,16 meaning that those 
seeking bankruptcy protection—ranging from individuals with few assets other than 
a pending motor vehicle suit to corporate conglomerates worth hundreds of millions 
of dollars on the open market, along with creditors who might be secured to the tune 
of a couple hundred dollars up to several hundred million dollars—all lack certainty 
as to how their disputes might be resolved in court.
 Section 102(7) is a codified version of just one of Western jurisprudence’s 
numerous canons of statutory analysis. These “rules of thumb” developed over many 
centuries as lawmakers, jurists, and legal philosophers sought to ensure that overly 
strict readings of statutes by jurists would not do violence to the intentions of enacting 
legislatures, and that practical readings—yielding the result that would have been 
favored by the enacting legislators had they been able to address the situation at 
issue—would ultimately prevail.17 In the United States, many statutory frameworks, 
at the federal and state level, include codified versions of some of the most widely 
recognized of these rules of thumb.18 The Code’s codified canons are found in § 102, 
which sets forth a list of rules of construction.19
 Among the most widely codified of the traditional canons is the principle that 
when a statute uses the singular form of a particular word, lawyers and judges may 
presume that the enacting legislature intended for this singular-form usage to also 
apply to situations involving more than one of the person or thing in question. 
Similarly, when a statute uses the plural form of a given word, applying that usage to 
13. See generally discussion infra Part III.B.
14. See, e.g., Christians v. Am. Express Travel Related Servs. (In re Djerf), 188 B.R. 586 (Bankr. D. Minn. 
1995).
15. See, e.g., In re Tribune Co., 464 B.R. 126 (Bankr. D. Del. 2011).
16. Compare, e.g., In re Djerf, 188 B.R. 586, with, e.g., Wilkey v. Credit Bureau Sys., Inc. (In re Clark), 171 B.R. 
563 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1994) (reaching opposite results on the question of whether wage-garnishment 
amounts should be aggregated for the purpose of determining if a preferential transfer has occurred).
17. See Yule Kim, Cong. Research Serv., 97-589, Statutory Interpretation: General Principles 
and Recent Trends 4 (2008), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/97-589.pdf. Written by 
legislators and applied by members of the judiciary to non-identical factual scenarios, statutes illustrate 
the fallibility of harnessing the power of the written word in an attempt to shape the final outcomes of 
situations that have not yet actually occurred. See Lawrence M. Solan, Linguistic Issues in Statutory 
Interpretation, in The Oxford Handbook of Language and Law 88, 88 (Peter Tiersma & Lawrence 
M. Solan eds., 2012) (“[E]vents that result in legal disputes do no always match with clarity the 
meanings of the words in governing statutes.”).
18. See generally Jacob Scott, Codified Canons and the Common Law of Interpretation, 98 Geo. L.J. 341 (2010) 
(surveying the use of codified canons in U.S. state statutory schemes).
19. See 11 U.S.C. § 102 (2013).
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situations involving only one person or thing is appropriate.20 The current version of 
§ 102(7) reflects the former half of this principle.21
 Other subsections of § 102 codify separate canons of statutory analysis. Section 
102(5), for example, provides that “‘or’ is not exclusive.”22 Although this codified 
canon’s analytical mandate would seemingly resolve any potential confusion over 
how to apply a multi-part statutory provision phrased in the disjunctive, § 102(5) has 
in recent years played a prominent role in a doctrinal schism among U.S. judges over 
the proper application of a key part of the Code governing “cramdowns” in Chapter 
11 cases;23 the dispute ultimately had to be resolved by the U.S. Supreme Court in a 
2012 decision authored by the Court’s soi-disant statutory-analysis guru.24
 If Congress wishes to promote a new level of clarity within the Code, it would 
behoove it to begin that process by ensuring that the Code’s general provisions25 help 
solve —rather than create—quandaries regarding the proper interpretation and 
construction26 of the Code’s non-general provisions. While judge-made common law 
may be predominant in many areas of U.S. law, bankruptcy law in the United States is 
regarded as largely bound by the four corners of the existing version of the Code.27 In 
addition, commentators increasingly have criticized the level of poor drafting that seems 
to plague the current version of the Code.28 Because of the high number of conflicting 
results secondary to adherence to (or rejection of) § 102(7), seeking a resolution to the 
20. See Scott, supra note 18, at 417.
21. See 11 U.S.C. § 102(7).
22. Id. § 102(5).
23. See discussion infra Part III.A (discussing conflicting decisions regarding the Code provision governing 
secured-creditor cramdowns).
24. See RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, 132 S. Ct. 2065, 2073 (2012) (Scalia, J.) 
(resolving the dispute discussed infra Part III.A).
25. Sections 101 through 112 comprise the Code’s “general provisions.” See 11 U.S.C. §§ 101–112. This note 
refers to those provisions as such, and to the Code’s subsequent sections as its “non-general” provisions.
26. See infra Part II.B.2 for a discussion of the difference between statutory interpretation and statutory 
construction. Many commentators employ the generic phrase “statutory analysis” rather than 
“interpretation” or “construction.” See generally, e.g., Charles R. Calleros, Introducing Students to 
Elementary Legislative Process and Statutory Analysis Through Experiential Learning in a Familiar Context, 
38 Gonz L. Rev. 33 (2003). To avoid confusion, this note uses the phrase “statutory analysis” as often 
as feasible.
27. See generally Thomas E. Lauria & Kevin McGill, Strict Construction of the Bankruptcy Code: Is the 
Inability to Avoid Clean-Up Obligations and Substantive Consolidation at Risk?, 1 Bloomberg Corp. L.J. 
478 (2006) (discussing, in the context of corporate bankruptcy law, U.S. courts’ tendency to adhere 
strictly to the provisions of the Code, as opposed to pre-Code precedent); see also RadLAX Gateway 
Hotel, LLC, 132 S. Ct. at 2073 (“[Though] pre-Code practices . . . can be relevant[,] . . . [t]he Bankruptcy 
Code standardizes an expansive (and sometimes unruly) area of law, and it is our obligation to interpret 
the Code clearly and predictably using well established principles of statutory construction.” (citing 
United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc. 489 U.S. 235, 240–41 (1989))).
28. See, e.g., Jean Braucher, A Guide to Interpretation of the 2005 Bankruptcy Law, 16 Am. Bankr. Inst. L. 
Rev. 349, 349 (2008) (describing the Code as “a defectively designed and poorly drafted mess”).
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problems associated with this particular provision of the Code’s foundational chapter 
would be a perfect starting point for any such clarity-promoting initiative.
 Part II of this note explores the history of the rules of thumb governing statutory 
analysis in Western jurisprudence, and the ways in which these rules came to be 
adopted in U.S. statutory frameworks, before examining the extent of the weight 
afforded to them by latter-day courts and legal scholars in the United States. In 
addition, Part II also focuses on the creation of the Code’s codified canons and why 
the rule of thumb embodied in § 102(7) is markedly different from its counterparts 
in other U.S. statutory frameworks. Part III first addresses the recently resolved 
circuit split regarding § 102(5) and the disjunctive nature of one of the Code 
provisions governing cramdowns in corporate reorganization cases. Part III then 
turns to the case law in which § 102(7) has prominently featured, detailing the 
different contexts in which adherence to—or rejection of—§ 102(7) has led to 
conflicting results.
 Part IV compares the conflicting approaches to § 102(7) by focusing closely on 
the logic found in the decision that rejected Phillips’s attempt to seek multiple 
exemptions under § 522(d)(11)(D). Part IV also considers the possible side effects of 
a § 102(7) that more closely tracks the “singular-plural” rule of thumb as codified in 
other statutory frameworks. Finally, Part V weighs possible solutions to the confusion 
surrounding § 102(7), ultimately arguing that it and the other non-bankruptcy-
specific provisions of § 102, including § 102(5), should be repurposed as 
statutory-analysis “guidelines” to be used in furtherance of the goal of best applying 
the non-general provisions of the Code in frequently recurring bankruptcy-related 
scenarios.
ii. a briEf histOrY Of thE rULEs Of COnstrUCtiOn
 A discussion of the Code’s rules of construction cannot proceed without a 
minimal level of background information regarding the various rules of thumb for 
analyzing statutory provisions. These general principles of statutory analysis are also 
commonly referred to as “canons.”29 As will be shown, using words and phrases with 
authoritative connotations to describe the canons arguably is misleading—Justice 
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. famously described the canons as “axiom[s] of experience” 
that do not amount to “rule[s] of law.”30 The level of respect that the canons garner 
among latter-day experts in statutory analysis (whether members of the bench or not) 
must also be considered before one can turn to the question of why a particular 
provision of § 102 may prompt different judges to reach different results in cases 
involving seemingly identical facts.
29. See, e.g., Kim, supra note 17, at 4.
30. Bos. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 278 U.S. 41, 48 (1928).
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 A. The Need for Guidance in an Increasingly Statutory World
 Legal scholars have propounded and debated the canons for at least several 
hundred years.31 While also traditionally seen as useful in interpreting and construing 
terms in other written documents, such as treaties, the canons have perhaps been most 
heavily relied on in applying to real-life situations the language of previously written 
statutes that govern conduct at the national and local levels.32 Many of the canons 
developed by legal scholars centuries ago have been codified in U.S. statutory 
schemes.33 As will be discussed below, a number of modern legal scholars have 
adopted theories on statutory analysis that either discount or almost entirely reject the 
need for the canons.34 However, the current version of § 102 contains a list of canons 
that are regularly invoked by judges overseeing bankruptcy-related disputes.35
  1. Linguistic Origins of the Canons
 Like many other areas of U.S. law, the tenets of bankruptcy in our country were 
originally shaped by the ref lections of English scholars.36 The earliest statutes of 
which written record still exists have been traced back to the reign of King Henry 
III, who ruled England throughout much of the thirteenth century.37 Prior to the era 
in which laws were created by a legislative body (or something close to it), and 
analyzed by courts of law or analogous bodies, the nature of English autarchy meant 
that the sovereign alone created the laws, enforced the laws, and explained why a 
particular law was being applied in a given situation.38
 After the duties of statutory enactment, on the one hand, and interpretation and 
construction, on the other, were definitively split between two separate groups of 
individuals, it became inevitable that statutory frameworks would fail to be, as Justice 
Benjamin N. Cardozo put it, “so f lexible and so minute, as to supply in advance for 
every conceivable situation the just and fitting rule.”39 The potential for disconnect 
31. See Fortunatus Dwarris, A General Treatise on Statutes: Their Rules of Construction, 
and the Proper Boundaries of Legislation and of Judicial Interpretation 133–43 (Platt 
Potter ed., Albany, N.Y., William Gould & Son 1871) (1830) (discussing the approach to the canons of 
Hugo Grotius and other seventeenth-century jurists).
32. See id. at 125 (“In all treaties, conventions, and statutes, inasmuch as language is the instrument or 
medium of expressing the intent; circumstances, not the time foreseen, give rise to different views, and 
sometimes to apparent contradictions, arising from the language of the same instrument.”).
33. See generally Scott, supra note 18 (surveying the use of codified canons in U.S. state statutory schemes).
34. See discussion infra Part II.B.
35. See discussion infra Part III.
36. See Gustav Adolf Endlich, A Commentary on the Interpretation of Statutes 541–42 
nn.155–61 (Jersey City, Frederick D. Linn & Co. 1888) (describing how U.S. judges followed the lead 
of their English counterparts in utilizing the canons to resolve ambiguities in statutory language).
37. See Dwarris, supra note 31, at 40.
38. See id. at 39–41.
39. See Benjamin Nathan Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process 143 (1921).
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between the intention of the legislature upon enactment, and the final result as 
determined by the judiciary upon application, arises due to four types of linguistic 
ambiguity that occur with regularity when a law is written: (1) syntactic ambiguity, 
where it is not clear which part of the sentence a constituent word modifies or agrees 
with;40 (2) semantic ambiguity, where a particular word or phrase is susceptible to 
more than one plausible understanding;41 (3) referential ambiguity, where it is unclear 
to which person or thing a non-specific term refers;42 and (4) definitional ambiguity, 
where a word that technically has a broad definition as used in the statute seems to 
lead to an absurd result as applied to a particular set of facts.43 When judges are faced 
with linguistic ambiguities, such as those that fall within these four categories, they 
often make linguistic presumptions about what the enacting legislature meant when 
it wrote the law in the manner that it did.44
  2. The Canons Come Stateside
 By 1850, English statutes had codified a number of widely recognized canons, 
including that language confined to the masculine gender also should be presumed 
to apply to the feminine gender, and—notably for this discussion—that the singular 
includes the plural, and vice versa.45 Not surprisingly, early U.S. case precedent 
contains approving references to canons such as those regarding number neutrality, 
and, as detailed in Part II.A.2.i below, these canons eventually became mainstays of 
U.S. statutory law. Part II.A.2.ii explains why the English language’s lack of precision 
regarding use of the word “or” has meant that the canon of statutory analysis reflected 
in § 102(5) has not been widely codified in statutory schemes.
   i. The Number-Neutrality Canons
 There is evidence that some three hundred years prior to the plural-includes-the-
singular canon’s mid-nineteenth-century codification in English statutory law, an 
English judge sitting during the reign of King Henry VII extolled the canon’s 
40. Solan, supra note 17, at 89.
41. Id. at 89–91.
42. Id. at 91–92.
43. Id. at 92–95.
44. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Norms, Empiricism, and Canons in Statutory Interpretation, 66 U. Chi. L. 
Rev. 671, 673–74 (1999). Considering one example of such a linguistic presumption as discussed in a 
nineteenth-century treatise on statutory analysis in Anglo-American law will be particularly useful in 
understanding the origins of § 102(7). Legislators in England enacted a statute proscribing the unlawful 
taking of “horses.” See Endlich, supra note 36, at 531. Did the legislature intend for this new law only 
to apply in cases in which a horse thief engages in the theft of multiple horses, meaning that a horse 
thief who has stolen only one horse will not be prosecuted? Even the most passionate of defense counsels 
would probably have had trouble making that argument with a straight face. The courts tasked with 
applying the law thus presumed that the legislature, in using the plural form of the thing susceptible to 
theft, also meant for that usage to capture the singular form. See id.
45. Endlich, supra note 36, at 541.
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usefulness in ensuring proper application of statutory law.46 The plural-includes-the-
singular canon featured prominently in an 1863 decision by the Supreme Court of 
Errors of Connecticut (then the state’s highest court) in an appeal stemming from 
the prosecution of a woman alleged to be the madam of a New Haven brothel.47 The 
law pursuant to which the defendant was charged stated that local law enforcement 
officers were allowed to take action against “any person who shall be guilty of  .  .  . 
keeping or maintaining houses reputed to be houses of bawdry and ill fame.”48 The 
court, citing English judges’ long-standing adherence to the plural-includes-the-
singular canon, rejected the argument that the defendant, accused of managing but a 
single house of ill repute, had been charged erroneously.49
 By the late 1800s, U.S. statutory frameworks at the federal and state level were 
codifying both the plural-includes-the-singular and the singular-includes-the-plural 
canons.50 At the state level, codification of these number-neutrality canons currently 
is widespread.51 A leading treatise explains that the manner in which English is 
commonly used in the modern era means that the number-neutrality canons, in 
particular, lend themselves well to U.S. jurisprudence.52
46. See State v. Main, 31 Conn. 572, 575 (1863) (citing Partridge v. Strange, (1553) 75 Eng. Rep. 123 (K.B.) 
138 (Hales, J.) (ruling that a property law that used the plural form in discussing “titles” to “lands” 
should be applied in cases involving a single title and a single piece of land)).
47. See id. at 572–75.
48. Id. at 575.
49. Id. at 574–75.
50. An 1872 opinion by the Supreme Court of Indiana, in a tax dispute involving a law discussing “aid[ing] 
a railroad company,” stressed that the state currently had a law on the books providing that “words 
importing the singular number only, may also be applied to the plural of persons and things.” Garrigus 
v. Bd. of Comm’rs, 39 Ind. 66, 70 (1872) (emphasis added). In an 1896 holding by the U.S. Supreme 
Court, in another railroad-related dispute—this one stemming from an 1870 federal law granting land 
in Oregon “to aid in the construction of a railroad”—the justices relied on the fact that the governing 
Revised Statutes of the United States contained in its first section a general provision stating that 
“words importing the singular number may extend and be applied to several persons or things [and] 
words importing the plural number may include the singular.” United States v. Or. & C.R. Co., 164 
U.S. 526, 541 (1896) (emphasis added).
51. One commentator’s 2010 analysis of state statutory schemes found that all fifty U.S. states have codified 
both of the number-neutrality canons with language that largely mirrors that found in the general 
provisions of the modern version of the U.S. Code. See Scott, supra note 18, at 371, 417. After the U.S. 
Code replaced the Revised Statutes, the replacing code assumed its predecessor’s version of the number-
neutrality canons; however, in 1948, a slight but important change was made to the introductory clause 
preceding the U.S. Code’s list of codified canons. Congress included language subordinating the canons 
to context: “In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, unless the context indicates otherwise [] 
words importing the singular include and apply to several persons, parties, or things [and] words 
importing the plural include the singular.” Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 645, § 6, 1948 U.S.C.C.A.N. (62 
Stat.) 859 (emphasis added) (current version at 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2013)).
52. Norman Singer & Shambie Singer, Sutherland Statutes and Statutory Construction § 47:34 
(7th ed. 2007) [hereinafter Sutherland] (“[The number-neutrality canons] ref lect the common 
understanding that the English language does not always carefully differentiate between singular and 
plural word forms, and especially in the abstract, such as in legislation prescribing a general rule for future 
application.”). However, another leading work on statutory analysis in U.S. law argues that the number-
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   ii. Confusion Surrounding Statutory Usage of “Or”
 The prospect of interchangeability between the English language’s conjunctive 
and disjunctive grammatical conjunctions caused headaches for England’s greatest 
legal minds as early as the sixteenth century.53 Consider the example of a 1601 
English law authorizing the setting aside of funds “for maintenance of sick and 
maimed soldiers.”54 Allowing distribution of benefits only to those veterans who 
were both ill and injured on the battlefield would have made a mockery of the 
charitable intent of the statute, and English judges chose to read the statute as 
benefiting “sick or maimed” veterans.55 Ultimately, the general consensus that arose 
among English jurists regarding the interchangeability of conjunctions was that 
while the context of a statute might call for substituting “and” with “or,” replacing 
“or” with “and” was frowned upon.56
 If “or” has been used in a statute, the potential for interchangeability between the 
English language’s conjunctive and disjunctive conjunctions is minimal when the statute 
in question sets forth a list of proscribed actions, indulgence in any one of which clearly 
would be expected to result in some form of liability.57 Conversely, the probability for 
confusion regarding what legislators intended when they employed “or” in a particular 
statutory provision runs high when the provision is phrased in the disjunctive and sets 
forth a list of conditions that must be met in order for a certain status to be recognized.58 
neutrality canons, though widely codified in U.S. statutory frameworks, are not often followed by courts as 
they go about analyzing substantive provisions of a particular statutory scheme. See William N. 
Eskridge, Jr. et al., Cases and Materials on Statutory Interpretation 340 (2012).
53. See Dwarris, supra note 31, at 237, 256, 285–86.
54. See Internal Revenue Serv., Exempt Organizations Continuing Professional Education 
(CPE) Technical Instruction Program for Fiscal Year 1980 pt. B (1980) (emphasis added) 
(citing Statute of Charitable Uses, 1601, 43 Eliz. 1, c. 4 (Eng.)), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/
irs-tege/eotopicb80.pdf. The “Elizabethan Statute of Charitable Uses” is the principal origin of the 
United States’ legal concept of charity. Id.
55. See Endlich, supra note 36, at 414.
56. See Dwarris, supra note 31, at 286. But for a notable case in which the court deemed it necessary to 
replace “or” with “and,” see Fowler v. Padget, (1798) 101 Eng. Rep. 1103 (K.B.) 1106 (Lord Kenyon, 
C.J.), which addressed a 1603 insolvency statute whose plain language seemed to suggest that a debtor 
who either intended to avoid his creditors or was not present at his residence when a creditor came 
calling could be subjected to involuntary repossession of his property.
57. See generally Sutherland, supra note 52, § 21:14 n.8 (listing federal and state decisions where statutes 
seemingly phrased in the disjunctive have been definitively interpreted as such by courts). This category 
of statutory phrasing occurs when the forms of proscribed conduct found within the list are practically 
(or actually) mutually exclusive. See id. Consider the following hypothetical example: “Tribeca Law 
School students, when situated within fifteen feet of the Main Building’s front entrance, shall not 
smoke cigarettes, chew tobacco, or utilize electronic nicotine-delivery devices.” The human body’s 
physical shortcomings would almost certainly prevent even the most nicotine-loving law student from 
engaging simultaneously in more than one of these acts.
58. See generally id. § 21:14 nn.15–17 (discussing U.S. judicial perspectives on the exclusive nature of “or” as 
it appears in various statutes). Consider this hypothetical example: “Each editor on the Executive Board 
of the Tribeca Law Review must, prior to graduation, write a work of legal scholarship under the tutelage 
of an approved faculty member, complete a course for which the final grade is based on production of a 
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The English language’s inherent imprecision59 as to the exclusivity or inclusivity of 
“or,” when used in the absence of clarifying language, has prompted the grammatical 
innovation “and/or,” use of which commentators strongly criticize as unhelpful with 
respect to the problem it purportedly addresses.60 The Code’s drafters chose to 
preempt any potential confusion regarding the exclusivity or inclusivity of “or” by 
creating § 102(5), which provides that use of the disjunctive conjunction in the Code 
should not be presumed to create mutually exclusive conditions.61
  3. The Canons and the U.S. Bankruptcy Code
 The Code’s codified canons as currently written cannot be analyzed properly 
without first examining the history of their inclusion in U.S. statutory bankruptcy 
law. The story behind the drafting of § 102(7), discussed in Part II.A.3.ii, is 
particularly intriguing.
   i. The General Structure of § 102
 The Bankruptcy Act of 1898 (“1898 Act”) marked the United States’ fourth 
attempt to institute a bankruptcy-specific statutory framework, and—having remained 
in effect until being replaced in 1978 by the current Code—it is regarded as a more 
comprehensive effort than the previous three bankruptcy statutory schemes, none of 
which remained on the books for more than eleven years.62 The 1898 Act contained 
sibling provisions codifying both the plural-includes-the-singular and singular-
includes-the-plural canons, with the language of those provisions being effectively 
work of legal scholarship, or have a work of legal scholarship published in a periodical listed at The 
Bluebook: A Uniform System of Citation 444 tbl.T.13 (Columbia Law Review Ass’n et al. eds., 
19th ed. 2010).” Tribeca Law’s administration clearly would not wish to penalize an “E-Board” student 
who satisfied more than one of the writing-requirement criteria.
59. Some scholars have posited that the Romans avoided this imprecision by using the disjunctive 
conjunction, vel, to signal inclusivity, and a separate disjunctive conjunction, aut, when exclusivity was 
desired. See John P. Finan, Lawgical: Jurisprudential and Logical Considerations, 15 Akron L. Rev. 675, 
682 (1982) (citing Irving M. Copi, Introduction to Logic 251 (4th ed. 1972)). Latter-day logicians 
reject as a “myth” the notion that Latin’s disjunctive conjunctions were utilized so as to differentiate 
between exclusive and inclusive contexts. See Ray Jennings & Andrew Hartline, Disjunction, in The 
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Edward N. Zalta ed., 2013), available at http://plato.
stanford.edu/entries/disjunction.
60. See Sutherland, supra note 52, § 21:14 n.20. Only one U.S. state—Louisiana—has heeded this 
admonition by enacting a general statutory provision that expressly rejects employment of “and/or.” See 
Scott, supra note 18, at 360 (citing La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 1:9 (2003)). 
61. See S. Rep. No. 95-989, at 28 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5814 (“Paragraph (5) 
specifies that ‘or’ is not exclusive. Thus, if a party ‘may do (a) or (b),’ then the party may do either or 
both. The party is not limited to a mutually exclusive choice between the two alternatives.”).
62. See Kenneth N. Klee, Legislative History of the New Bankruptcy Law, 28 DePaul L. Rev. 941, 941 n.1 
(1979).
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identical to that of their counterparts in the Revised Statutes and the pre–1948 version 
of the U.S. Code’s general provisions.63
 Legislative history documents created during enactment of the current Code 
contain other statements relevant to this discussion. Several of § 102’s rules of 
construction were created specifically for the Code; for example, § 102(2) provides 
that the phrase “claim against the debtor” should be presumed to include “claim[s] 
against property of the debtor.”64 However, other provisions of § 102—§ 102(5) and 
§ 102(7) among them—amount to codifications of non-bankruptcy-specific canons.65
 There is one final feature of § 102 that bears mentioning. While the introductory 
line of Title I of the U.S. Code’s codified-canons section makes clear that the canons 
listed therein should be subordinated to “context” (whenever context compels a 
contrary result to that which would follow from adherence to a given canon), § 102 
of the Code contains no such qualifier, merely indicating that “[i]n this title” the 
specified “[r]ules of construction” are to be followed by courts applying the non-
general provisions of the Code.66
   ii. § 102(7)’s Half-Hearted Adoption of the Number-Neutrality Canons
 When the Code was adopted in 1978, a curious thing happened: the plural-
includes-the-singular provision dropped out of the bankruptcy scheme’s list of 
codified canons.67 The Code was ten years in the making, and the process saw bitter 
disputes regarding a number of issues, including the constitutional status of 
bankruptcy judges.68 But there is frustratingly little evidence of the intent behind the 
Code drafters’ unique halving of the number-neutrality canon codification so 
prevalent in other U.S. statutory schemes, save for a few words included in legislative 
history records.69
63. See Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 1(29)–(30), 1898 U.S.C.C.A.N. (30 Stat.) 544 (repealed 1979). 
The 1898 Act contained no predecessor provision to what is now § 102(5). See generally id. ch. 541 
(revealing no provision pertaining to the exclusivity or inclusivity of “or”).
64. See S. Rep. No. 95-989, at 28.
65. See id. At least one provision of § 102 ref lects judicial wisdom regarding the utility of a particular canon: 
§ 102(3)—specifying that “includes” and “including” are not limiting—codifies an oft-repeated canon 
endorsed by the U.S. Supreme Court in a 1933 decision. See id. (citing Am. Sur. Co. v. Marotta, 287 
U.S. 513 (1933)).
66. Compare 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2013), with 11 U.S.C. § 102 (2013).
67. Compare Bankruptcy Act § 1(29)–(30), with 11 U.S.C. § 102(7).
68. See Klee, supra note 62, at 947; see also N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 
(1982) (plurality opinion) (finding that the Bankruptcy Act of 1978 violated Article III of the 
Constitution to the extent that it allowed judges not enjoying the protections of life tenure and stable 
salaries to exercise federal jurisdiction over private causes of action).
69. See generally S. Rep. No. 95-989, at 28 (“Paragraph (7) specifies that the singular includes the plural. 
The plural, however, generally does not include the singular. The bill uses only the singular, even when 
the item in question most often is found in plural quantities, in order to avoid the confusion possible if 
both rules of construction applied. When an item is specified in the plural, the plural is intended.”).
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 During the course of my research for this note, I interviewed Kenneth N. Klee 
and Richard Levin, the two principal drafters of the Code. According to Klee, 
leaving the plural-includes-the-singular canon out of § 102 allowed him and his 
fellow drafters to “mandate group action” in key non-general provisions of the Code, 
such as § 1102 (which addresses creditors’ committees),70 without having to include 
in these non-general provisions extra language clarifying that group action was what 
Congress intended in using pluralized language.71 Levin says that when legislative 
drafters use the plural at the outset of a sentence—purportedly for the sake of 
exactness—it often leads to ambiguity in subsequent parts of the sentence when 
references are made back to the person or thing previously identified using the plural 
number, but these references do not utilize both the singular and the plural number.72
 B. Modern Theories on Divining Legislative Intent
 Judges, lawmakers, and legal scholars in both England and the United States 
may have unquestioningly adhered to the canons for an untold number of years, but 
by the mid-twentieth century, the canons were under fire.73 As will be discussed 
below, recent decades have seen high-profile judges in the United States effectively 
divide themselves among competing camps of statutory-analysis legal theory—a 
division that seems to be determinative of whether a particular judge will or will not 
look favorably on use of the various canons.74 Meanwhile, as these battle lines have 
been drawn and become entrenched, a minority of legal scholars have advocated for 
an evaluation of the distinction between “interpreting” and “construing” statutes.75
70. See 11 U.S.C. § 1102.
71. Telephone Interview with Kenneth N. Klee, Founding Partner, Klee, Tuchin, Bogdanoff & Stern LLP; 
Assoc. Counsel, Comm. on Judiciary, U.S. House of Representatives, 1974–1977 (Nov. 8, 2013) 
[hereinafter Klee Interview]. Using as an example § 1102(b), which speaks of “persons[] willing to 
serve” on a committee, Klee explained how applying the plural-includes-the-singular canon to a 
provision of the Code that includes pluralized language could thwart the public policy goals underlying 
that provision: If terms such as “creditors” and “persons” were singularized, then § 1102(b) would be 
interpreted as allowing for a committee to be comprised of a single creditor (or a single equity security 
holder), a result that would be contrary to the “group action” goal underlying the provision. Id. 
(discussing 11 U.S.C. § 1102). “The reference in 1 U.S.C. § 1 [to the plural-includes-the-singular 
canon] always struck me as sloppy drafting,” Klee said. Id. (citing 1 U.S.C. § 1).
72. Telephone Interview with Richard Levin, Partner, Cravath, Swaine & Moore LLP; Assoc. Counsel, 
Comm. on Judiciary, U.S. House of Representatives, 1974–1977 (Nov. 25, 2013) [hereinafter Levin 
Interview].
73. In 1950, Professor Karl Llewellyn published his oft-cited commentary that delineated inconsistencies 
between a number of prevailing canons, and thus begged the question whether the canons were anything 
more than ideal weapons for the judicial activist’s arsenal. See Kim, supra note 17, at 4 (citing Karl N. 
Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are To 
Be Construed, 3 Vand. L. Rev. 395 (1950)).
74. See discussion infra Part II.B.1.
75. See discussion infra Part II.B.2.
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  1. Intentionalism, Textualism, and Purposivism
 Until the latter half of the twentieth century, “classical intentionalism” was the 
prevailing legal theory among U.S. federal judges.76 This legal theory emphasizes 
“ascertain[ing] as accurately as possible what Congress meant by the words it used” in 
a particular statute.77 In recent years, however, a number of influential judges have 
popularized “textualism,” whose adherents exalt the primacy of the statutory text and 
tend to eschew extrinsic sources such as legislative histories.78 Textualists tend to be 
“attract[ed] to rule-based canons [because of] an implicit belief that such canons 
accurately reflect congressional habits of mind.”79 Not surprisingly, critics of textualism 
often discount the efficacy of invoking the canons when analyzing statutory law.80
 Somewhere between intentionalism and textualism lies “purposivism,” in which 
a formulation as to the purpose behind the enactment of a particular statute guides 
the jurist in analyzing that statute’s language.81 One commentator has noted the 
differences between “traditional” purposivists—among them Justice John Paul 
Stevens, who avoided reliance on extrinsic sources such as dictionaries and shunned 
semantic canons—and “new” purposivists—including Justices Stephen Breyer and 
Elena Kagan, who “frequently cite dictionaries” and “resort to the once-discredited 
semantic canons of construction to ascertain the meaning of statutory texts.”82
 As this overview of the prevailing schools of legal theory shows, some U.S. 
judges might be unwilling to rely on a canon styled as a “rule of construction,” while 
other judges might be willing, or even eager, to do so.
  2. Distinguishing “Interpretation” from “Construction”
 Though some scholars deride the distinction as irrelevant,83 a number of legal 
theorists insist on differentiating between interpretation—“the activity of identifying 
76. See John F. Manning, Textualism and Legislative Intent, 91 Va. L. Rev. 419, 419 (2005).
77. Id.
78. See id. at 420. U.S. Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia and U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit Judge Frank Easterbrook are perhaps the most prominent textualists. See id.
79. Id. at 423.
80. See id. at 436 n.57 (citing Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation—In the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 
50 U. Chi. L. Rev. 800, 805–17 (1983)). For further written scholarly debate over textualism, compare 
Richard A. Posner, The Incoherence of Antonin Scalia, New Republic (Aug. 24, 2012), http://www.
newrepublic.com/article/magazine/books-and-arts/106441/scalia-garner-reading-the-law-textual-
originalism# (reviewing Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation 
of Legal Texts (2012)), with Bryan A. Garner, Response to Richard A. Posner, LawProse (Sept. 5, 2012), 
http://www.lawprose.org/blog/?p=570 (responding, via blog post, to Judge Posner’s critical review of the 
book that Garner had co-authored with Justice Scalia).
81. See Richard A. Posner, Justice Breyer Throws Down the Gauntlet, 115 Yale L.J. 1699, 1710 (2006) 
(outlining the philosophical boundaries of purposivism).
82. John F. Manning, The New Purposivism, 2011 Sup. Ct. Rev. 113, 174–75.
83. See, e.g., Sutherland, supra note 52, § 45:4 (“Th[e] distinction is not helpful. . . . [J]udicial behavior in 
resolving statutory issues does not appear to differ whether it is characterized as construction or 
interpretation.”). 
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the semantic meaning of a particular use of language in context”—and construction—
the act of “applying [that identified] meaning to particular factual circumstances.”84 
Legal theorists who insist on this distinction between interpretation and construction 
similarly divide the canons along these lines, arguing that canons of interpretation 
amount to rules of thumb that reflect the most common features of “general linguistic 
regularity” and thus are not necessarily outcome-determinative even when invoked. 
In contrast, canons of construction tend to be “substantive” in form and, when 
utilized, obligate jurists to reach the result dictated by the canon.85 It is important to 
keep this distinction in mind when analyzing what the Code’s drafters designated as 
its “rules of construction.”
III. TAKING MEASURE OF THE CONFLICTING RESULTS UNDER § 102
 Judges’ willingness or reluctance to adhere closely to § 102 when faced with 
questions of statutory analysis concerning the Code’s non-general provisions has led 
to conflicting results in a surprisingly varied range of bankruptcy-related disputes. A 
categorized survey of these conflicting results follows below; judicial confusion as to 
the proper application of § 102(5) will be analyzed first, followed by an overview of 
the various legal disputes in which § 102(7) has featured prominently.
 A. Disjunctive Disjunction: § 102(5)’s Role in the Fight Over Credit Bidding
 Section 1129 of the Code sets forth the provisions to which corporate 
reorganization plans must conform in order to be confirmed by the overseeing 
court.86 Section 1129(b)(1) provides that a plan that has not been accepted by all 
parties with a claim against the debtor cannot be confirmed unless it is “fair and 
equitable” to those non-accepting claimholders;87 § 1129(b)(2) establishes the criteria 
for this standard, delineating two sets of criteria depending upon whether the non-
accepting “class” of claimholders possesses secured or unsecured claims.88 Section 
1129(b)(2)(A) addresses the criteria for the secured-class scenario.89
84. See Randy E. Barnett, Interpretation and Construction, 34 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 65, 66 (2011); see also 
Lawrence B. Solum, The Interpretation-Construction Distinction, 27 Const. Comment. 95, 114 (2010).
85. See Solum, supra note 84, at 113 (comparing the no-superf luous-language canon of interpretation to the 
constitutional-question-avoidance canon of construction).
86. See generally 11 U.S.C. § 1129 (2013) (setting forth the Code’s plan-confirmation provisions).
87. Id. § 1129(b)(1).
88. Id. § 1129(b)(2).
89. Section 1129(b)(2) includes the following language:
(2) For the purpose of this subsection, the condition that a plan be fair and equitable 
with respect to a class includes the following requirements:
  (A) With respect to a class of secured claims, the plan provides—(i)(I) that the 
holders of such claims retain the liens securing such claims, whether the property 
subject to such liens is retained by the debtor or transferred to another entity . . . ; 
and (II) that each holder of a claim of such class receive on account of such claim 
deferred cash payments totaling at least the allowed amount of such claim  .  .  .  ;  
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 Section 1129(b) allows for what is commonly referred to in bankruptcy law as a 
“cramdown”: so long as the requirements of this subsection are met, the reorganizing 
debtor may seek to have the plan—in particular, a plan involving the sale of the debtor’s 
assets—confirmed by the court despite the objections of adversely affected creditors.90 
During the first few decades of the Code’s existence, the (seemingly uncontroversial) 
interpretation of § 1129(b)(2)(A) was that § 1129(b)(2)(A)(i) covered cramdown sales 
in which the secured claimholders’ liens remained in place; § 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii) applied 
to cramdown sales in which the property had been stripped of the claimholders’ liens, 
but those claimholders were permitted, pursuant to § 363(k), to offer to forgive the 
debt owed to them as part of a bid at the sale of their collateral; and § 1129(b)(2)(A)(iii) 
governed cramdown sales in which some other form of remuneration—one that 
represents “the indubitable equivalent”91 of the claimholder’s claim—is made available 
to any non-accepting claimholders.92
 However in 2009, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit—in a decision 
authored by its chief judge, a former bankruptcy practitioner—called for a different 
approach grounded in the disjunctive wording of § 1129(b)(2)(A).93 According to the 
Fifth Circuit’s opinion in In re Pacific Lumber Co., a debtor is permitted to arrange 
for a cramdown sale in which assets are sold free of objecting claimholder liens, plan 
for some form of remuneration to the objecting claimholders but deny them the 
opportunity to credit bid, and then seek confirmation from the overseeing court 
pursuant to § 1129(b)(2)(A)(iii)’s “indubitable equivalent” standard.94
 The following year, the majority of a three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Third Circuit adopted the Fifth Circuit’s reading of § 1129(b)(2)(A)(iii), 
stressing the express language of § 102(5) and noting that, according to the legislative 
history underlying that codified canon, “‘[a] party is not limited to a mutually exclusive 
(ii) for the sale, subject to section 363(k) of this title, of any property that is subject 
to the liens securing such claims, free and clear of such liens, with such liens to 
attach to the proceeds of such sale . . . ; or (iii) for the realization by such holders of 
the indubitable equivalent of such claims.
 Id. (emphasis added).
90. See In re Phila. Newspapers, LLC, 599 F.3d 298, 321–22 (3d Cir. 2010) (Ambro, J., dissenting).
91. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(iii); see also In re Phila. Newspapers, 599 F.3d at 326 (defining “indubitable equivalent” 
as “consideration equal to [the creditor’s] claim in value or amount”). The “indubitable equivalent” 
language in § 1129(b)(2)(A)(iii) derives from a 1935 decision by Judge Learned Hand who, in analyzing 
the cramdown statute then in existence, argued that there is “no reason to suppose that the statute was 
intended to deprive” secured creditors of their money or their fair share of the subject property “unless 
by a substitute of the most indubitable equivalence.” Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Murel Holding Corp. (In re 
Murel Holding Corp.), 75 F.2d 941, 942 (2d Cir. 1935). Congress, in passing § 1129, made clear that it 
intended for § 1129(b)(2)(A)(iii) to ref lect Judge Hand’s “strict approach.” S. Rep. No. 95-989, at 127 
(1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5913.
92. See In re Phila. Newspapers, 599 F.3d at 325–26 (Ambro, J., dissenting).
93. Id. at 322–23 (citing In re Pac. Lumber Co., 584 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2009) (Jones, C.J.)).
94. See In re Pac. Lumber Co., 584 F.3d at 246–47. 
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choice between the two alternatives.’”95 The In re Philadelphia Newspapers, LLC 
majority noted that in 1996 the U.S. Supreme Court had approved of a reading of a 
tripartite provision in another statutory framework under which the presence of a 
broadly worded catchall prong allowed litigants to circumvent the provisions of a 
more specifically worded prong.96
 The dissenting judge in Philadelphia Newspapers strongly disagreed with the 
majority’s “more-recent interpretation of § 1129(b)(2)(A),” arguing that the canon 
codified at § 102(5), while “true as a general proposition[,] is not always the case in 
practice”—for example, a disjunctively worded provision of the Code setting forth 
one option that can occur before a particular event, and one option that can occur 
after that event, does not conform to the express mandate of § 102(5).97 The 
dissenting judge went on to argue that the traditional reading of § 1129(b)(2)(A) was 
supported by a well-known canon absent from the Code: Specifically worded 
provisions prevail over broadly worded provisions.98
 In 2011, a three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 
created a jurisdictional split by unanimously adopting the reading of § 1129(b)(2)(A) 
advocated by the dissenting judge in Philadelphia Newspapers in a consolidated case 
involving two debtors (with a common lender) who sought to have confirmed under 
§ 1129(b)(2)(A)(iii) cramdown sales in which the assets would be stripped of liens 
without affording secured creditors the chance to credit bid.99
 The Seventh Circuit’s ruling was appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, which 
affirmed in an eight-to-zero decision.100 Writing for the Court in RadLAX Gateway 
Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, Justice Antonin Scalia relied in large part on the 
“well established canon” that specific provisions be favored over general provisions, 
and rejected the debtors’ argument that the traditional reading of § 1129(b)(2)(A) 
caused the provision’s “or” conjunction to be changed to “and.”101 Justice Scalia 
reasoned that the “structure” of § 1129(b)(2)(A) “suggests” that the traditional 
reading is the one intended by Congress, and that as long as debtors were not required 
95. In re Phila. Newspapers, 599 F.3d at 305 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 315 (1977)).
96. Id. at 307 (citing Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 511–12 (1996) (addressing a provision of the 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act)).
97. See id. at 322–24 (Ambro, J., dissenting). Judge Thomas L. Ambro is widely regarded as the Third 
Circuit’s foremost bankruptcy expert. See, e.g., Benjamin D. Feder, Third Circuit Decision in Philadelphia 
Newspapers Leaves Crucial Issue Unresolved, 7 Am. Bankr. Inst. Asset Sales Committee Newsl. 
(Am. Bankr. Inst., Alexandria, Va.), June 2010, at 2.
98. In re Phila. Newspapers, 599 F.3d at 328–30. This canon—also referred to by its Latinate form, generalia 
specialibus non derogant—has been described by the U.S. Supreme Court as an “ancient interpretive 
principle.” Nitro-Lift Techs., L.L.C. v. Howard, 133 S. Ct. 500, 504 (2012) (per curiam).
99. See generally River Rd. Hotel Partners, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, 651 F.3d 642 (7th Cir. 2011) 
(reaching an opposite conclusion to that of the majority in Philadelphia Newspapers). By way of definition, 
“[a] credit bid allows a secured lender to bid its debt in lieu of cash.” In re Phila. Newspapers, 599 F.3d at 
302 n.4.
100. RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, 132 S. Ct. 2065 (2012) (8-0 decision).
101. Id. at 2070–72.
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to comply with both the second and third prong of § 1129(b)(2)(A), the disjunctive 
nature of the provision remained intact.102
 B. A Surprising Variety of Contexts
 As will be analyzed below, there is confusion over the extent to which § 102(7) 
has affected both personal Chapter 7 debtors and large corporate debtors pursuing a 
Chapter 11 reorganization.
  1. Wage Garnishments Against Debtors
 Section 547 of the Code addresses transfers from debtors to creditors that may, in 
certain circumstances, be avoided by the trustee as “preferences” if they occurred 
within a certain range of temporal proximity to the filing of the debtor’s case.103 
Section 547(c), however, presents a list of situations in which the trustee is not 
permitted to avoid what would otherwise be considered a preferential transfer.104 
Among these situations is the scenario of an individual debtor with “primarily 
consumer debts,” and for whom “the aggregate value of all property that constitutes 
or is affected by such transfer is less than $600.”105 The question thus has arisen 
whether a series of sub-$600 payments that have been siphoned out of a debtor’s 
bank account within the relevant preference period pursuant to a garnishment 
initiated by a creditor should be added together for the purpose of determining if an 
avoidable preference has occurred.106
 In 1994, bankruptcy courts in Missouri and Kentucky rejected the argument that 
multiple garnishment-related transfers could be aggregated in evaluating whether the 
$600 threshold had been breached;107 neither decision made reference to § 102(7).108 
But within a year, bankruptcy judges in New Mexico, Minnesota, and Mississippi 
102. See id. at 2072. Kenneth Klee approves of this result and believes that § 102(5) did not “answer the 
question” posed by RadLAX because the codification of certain canons within § 102 does not preclude 
courts from applying “other court-made doctrines” to the Code’s non-general provisions. Klee Interview, 
supra note 71. Richard Levin also agrees with the Court’s decision in RadLAX: “We weren’t thinking a 
lot at the time about multi-debtor plans . . . . Contrary to popular belief, [§ 1129] was created for the 
small- to medium-sized debtors—it was not created for big businesses, it was just adapted that way.” 
Levin Interview, supra note 72.
103. See generally 11 U.S.C. § 547 (2013) (setting forth the Code’s rules regarding preferential transfers).
104. See id. § 547(c).
105. Id. § 547(c)(8) (emphasis added). Until 1995, the $600-or-less exception was codified at § 547(c)(7). See 
Alarcon v. Commercial Credit Corp. (In re Alarcon), 186 B.R. 135, 136 (Bankr. D.N.M. 1995).
106. See In re Alarcon, 186 B.R. at 136.
107. Howes v. Hannibal Clinic (In re Howes), 165 B.R. 270, 271–72 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1994); Wilkey v. 
Credit Bureau Sys., Inc. (In re Clark), 171 B.R. 563, 564 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1994), rev’d, 217 B.R. 89 
(W.D. Ky. 1995).
108. See generally In re Howes and In re Clark, neither of which references the singular-includes-the-plural 
canon or its codified version in the Code.
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held that, in light of § 102(7)’s express language, the singular use of “transfer” in § 
547(c) also extends to multiple transfers occurring within the preference period.109
  2. Tithes and Charitable Contributions as Fraudulent Transfers
 In 1998—after years of judicial confusion as to the propriety of treating individual 
debtors’ charitable contributions as fraudulent transfers in violation of § 548 of the 
Code—Congress passed the Religious Liberty and Charitable Donation Protection 
Act, which amended § 548(a)(2) to the effect that “[a] transfer of a charitable 
contribution” to a religious or charitable group may not be declared fraudulent so 
long as “the amount of that contribution” is less than fifteen percent of the debtor’s 
gross annual income for the year “in which the transfer of the contribution is made.”110
 The latent tension between § 102(7) and § 548(a)(2), as amended by Congress in 
1998, came to the fore in Universal Church v. Geltzer, which was heard by the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in 2006.111 The debtor in the underlying 
bankruptcy case had, within the pre-petition fraudulent-transfer period, made a 
number of contributions to her church—most for less than $1,500.112 However, when 
aggregated, these tithes amounted to well over fifteen percent of the debtor’s annual 
gross income for the relevant calendar years; and when the debtor filed for bankruptcy, 
these contributions were challenged as fraudulent transfers.113
 The appellate panel in Universal Church reasoned that, while the controlling 
version of § 548(a)(2) was facially unambiguous, it became ambiguous once the canon 
codified in § 102(7) was applied to its language: Pluralizing the language of § 548(a)(2) 
results in a reading of the provision pursuant to which each tithe or contribution 
must be considered on an individual basis, which would mean that a pre-petition 
debtor could safely give all of her remaining money to the worthy (but non-creditor) 
causes of her choosing, so long as she did so in the form of multiple contributions or 
tithes with each totaling less than fifteen percent of her annual gross income.114 The 
court reasoned that allowing debtors to frustrate creditors’ claims in this manner is a 
scenario that Congress could not have intended when it amended § 548(a)(2) in 
1998; the panel then turned to the legislative history to resolve the statutory 
ambiguity against the validity of the tithes at issue.115
109. See In re Alarcon, 186 B.R. at 136–37; Christians v. Am. Express Travel Related Servs. (In re Djerf), 188 
B.R. 586 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1995); Electric City Merch. Co. v. Hailes (In re Hailes), 77 F.3d 873 (5th 
Cir. 1996).
110. See Lawrence A. Reicher, Comment, Drafting Glitches in the Religious Liberty and Charitable Donation 
Protection Act of 1998: Amend § 548(A)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code, 24 Emory Bankr. Dev. J. 159, 160–61, 
163 (2008) (emphasis added) (quoting 11 U.S.C.A. § 548(a)(2) (West 2007)).
111. 463 F.3d 218 (2d Cir. 2006).
112. Id. at 222.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 224.
115. Id. at 224–25. In so holding, the court acknowledged that a Louisiana bankruptcy court—the only other 
court to address the issue—had, in a 1999 decision, suggested in dicta that an individual-contribution 
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 Furthermore, the panel in Universal Church rejected the argument that § 548(a)(2) 
did not need to be re-read with § 102(7) in mind on the ground that, just like the 
singular-includes-the-plural canon in the codified-canons section of the U.S. Code, 
§ 102(7) should not be applied to the Code’s non-general provisions unless the context 
of such a provision indicates otherwise.116 The court reasoned that § 102(7), in contrast, 
“appears within the specific title under consideration” and clearly states that the rules 
of construction listed therein are to be applied to the various provisions of the Code.117
  3. Personal Injury Claim Exemptions for Debtors
 Section 522 of the Code sets forth the various exemptions that individual debtors 
may claim when their assets are converted to property of the bankruptcy estate.118 
One provision of this section, § 522(d)(11)(D), provides that among the property 
eligible for exemption is the right to receive “a payment, not to exceed [a fixed amount 
of money adjusted for inflation], on account of personal bodily injury, not including 
pain and suffering or compensation for actual pecuniary loss, of the debtor.”119
 The potential for tension between § 102(7) and § 522(d)(11)(D) arises in 
situations in which the debtor, at the time the bankruptcy petition is filed, is in the 
process of litigating more than one personal injury claim (or has already litigated 
multiple personal injury claims and received payments as a result of this litigation), 
and the estimated (or realized) value of these claims totals more than the amount 
stated in § 522(d)(11)(D).120
 In re Marcus, decided in 1994 by the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of 
Connecticut, addressed a debtor who was involved in two motor vehicle accidents 
within the four-month period preceding his Chapter 7 petition.121 The resulting 
personal injury actions settled for $12,500 and $30,000 respectively; at the time, the 
maximum exemption amount under § 522(d)(11)(D) was $7,500.122 The In re Marcus 
bankruptcy judge—without citing to § 102(7)—found that § 522(d)(11)(D) is 
analysis would be appropriate, notwithstanding the mandate of § 102(7), because the newly amended § 
548(a)(2), unlike other provisions within the Code (such as § 547(c)), does not call for aggregating the 
amounts of challenged transfers. Id. at 225 n.3 (citing Murray v. La. State Univ. Found. (In re Zohdi), 
234 B.R. 371, 380 n.20 (Bankr. M.D. La. 1999)).
116. See Universal Church, 463 F.3d at 223 (citing 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2013)) (“[U]nless the context indicates 
otherwise—words importing the singular include and apply to several persons, parties, or things . . . .”); 
see also First Nat’l Bank v. Missouri, 263 U.S. 640, 657 (1924) (noting that the singular-includes-the-
plural canon in § 1 of the U.S. Code “is not one to be applied except where it is necessary to carry out 
the evident intent of the statute”).
117. Universal Church, 463 F.3d at 223. 
118. See 11 U.S.C. § 522 (2013).
119. Id. § 522(d)(11)(D).
120. In 2013, that amount was $15,000. See id. As of the date of publication, the personal injury exemption 
amount is $22,975. See U.S.C.A. § 522(d)(11)(D) (West 2015).
121. 172 B.R. 502, 503 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1994).
122. Id.
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ambiguous with respect to the possibility of claiming multiple exemptions on more 
than one claim for bodily injury; he noted that, unlike other provisions within § 
522(d), §  522(d)(11)(D) did not call for an aggregation of the amounts at issue.123 
The judge ultimately ruled in favor of the debtor, arguing that it was “entirely 
rational” for Congress to have intended that debtors who have suffered more than 
one life-altering injury over the course of multiple unrelated accidents not be limited 
to a single exemption under § 522(d)(11)(D).124
 Bankruptcy judges in Texas and Pennsylvania subsequently reached the same result 
as the In re Marcus court—also without citing to § 102(7)—in cases involving analogous 
fact patterns.125 However in 1999, a panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First 
Circuit ruled against a debtor seeking multiple exemptions under § 522(d)(11)(D) for 
multiple personal injury claims.126 The In re Christo majority reasoned that, while 
§ 522(d)(11)(D) was susceptible to more than one interpretation, it was clear that 
Congress could not have intended for a debtor who had sustained minor injuries over 
the course of multiple pre-petition accidents to be eligible for a larger exemption than a 
debtor who had been catastrophically injured in a single event.127 One member of the 
panel dissented, finding that § 522(d)(11)(D) is wholly ambiguous as to the propriety 
of claiming multiple personal injury exemptions, that the legislative history does not 
help resolve the ambiguity, and that holding in favor of the debtor was warranted 
pursuant to a “well-established” canon: exemption-creating statutes should be construed 
liberally in favor of the debtor.128
 In 2012, as discussed in Part I, a judge from the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the 
Eastern District of New York prevented debtor Anthony Phillips from seeking 
multiple exemptions on multiple personal injury claims, but for different reasons 
than the Christo majority. The In re Phillips court stressed that the Code’s 
rules of construction must be followed in determining the plain meaning of the 
Code’s provisions and that, when § 522(d)(11)(D) is read in light of § 102(7), the 
result is an unambiguous statute restricting eligible debtors to a single exemption of 
the figure listed in § 522(d)(11)(D), regardless of how many personal injury accidents 
a debtor may have suffered or the number of “payments” a debtor may have received 
in conjunction with a personal injury claim.129
123. Id. at 504.
124. Id. at 505.
125. See In re Comeaux, 305 B.R. 802 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 2003) (containing no reference to § 102(7)); Opel 
v. Daly (In re Daly), 344 B.R. 304 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 2005) (same).
126. Christo v. Yellin (In re Christo), 192 F.3d 36, 37 (1st Cir. 1999).
127. Id. at 38–39.
128. Id. at 40–41 (Gibson, J., dissenting).
129. 485 B.R. 53, 57, 61–62 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2012).
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  4. Multi-plan Reorganizations Under Chapter 11
 Section 1129(a)(10) of the Code governs confirmation of a reorganization plan by 
the overseeing bankruptcy court; it provides that when “a class of claims is impaired 
under the plan, at least one class of claims that is impaired under the plan [must] 
accept[] the plan.”130 Some Chapter 11 proceedings involve a group of corporate 
affiliates that are technically independent entities, but have common financial 
interests and interrelated debts.131 Such cases may, for the sake of convenience, be 
jointly administered and feature jointly filed plans.132 When more than one group of 
entities involved in such proceedings—i.e., multiple groups comprised of debtors 
and/or creditors—comes up with competing plans, satisfying the “impaired class” 
requirement of § 1129(a)(10) poses a conceptual conundrum: Should the court 
interpret the statute as mandating what is known as a “per plan” requirement, which 
is satisfied by the acceptance of one impaired class for any debtor involved in the 
proceedings, or does § 1129(a)(10) contemplate a “per debtor” requirement, meaning 
the plan must be approved by at least one impaired class for each debtor involved?133
 In 2009, a New York City-based bankruptcy court issued a decision that seemed 
to endorse the “per plan” view;134 the decision did not include any reference to 
§ 102(7).135 But in a 2011 decision, a judge from the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the 
District of Delaware adopted a “per debtor” reading of § 1129(a)(10) after citing to 
§ 102(7), reasoning: “[T]he fact that § 1129(a)(10) refers to ‘plan’ in the singular is 
not a basis, alone, upon which to conclude that, in a multiple debtor case, only one 
debtor—or any number fewer than all debtors—must satisfy [the impaired-class] 
standard.”136
IV. WEIGHING THE CONFLICTING APPROACHES TO § 102(7)
 Before weighing possible solutions to the statutory-analysis issues highlighted by 
the cases discussed in Part III, it is necessary to consider whether a non-bankruptcy-
specific rule of construction such as § 102(7) could ever be effective in resolving 
statutory ambiguity. And, with respect to § 102(7) specifically, the logic (or lack 
thereof) behind the Code’s partial codification of the traditional number-neutrality 
canon must be analyzed.
130. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(10) (2013) (emphasis added).
131. See Shane G. Ramsey & Matthew R. Hindman, Does § 1129(a)(10) Impose a Per Debtor or Per Plan 
Requirement?, 10 Am. Bankr. Inst. Young & New Members Committee Newsl. (Am. Bankr. Inst., 
Alexandria, Va.), Mar. 2012, at 3.
132. See In re Tribune Co., 464 B.R. 126, 183 (Bankr. D. Del. 2011).
133. See Ramsey & Hindman, supra note 131, at 1.
134. See JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Charter Commc’ns Operating, LLC (In re Charter Commc’ns), 419 
B.R. 221 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009).
135. See id. (containing no reference to § 102(7)).
136. In re Tribune Co., 464 B.R. at 182.
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 A. Rethinking the Logic of Phillips
 Adherence to § 102’s codified canons does not appear to be optional. In contrast 
to the codified-canons section of the U.S. Code, § 102 lacks introductory qualifying 
language that would support a court’s reasoning that, given the context of a particular 
statutory provision, applying a certain codified canon to the provision at issue is 
unwarranted.137 This concept of mandatory adherence to § 102’s codified canons 
explains why the bankruptcy court in Phillips deemed § 522(d)(11)(D) facially 
ambiguous when read in light of § 102(7), even though bankruptcy judges in other 
jurisdictions (and one appellate panel within another circuit) seemed confident that 
the opposite was true.138
 But a closer analysis of the Phillips court’s application of the singular-includes-
the-plural canon to the singular-form language of § 522(d)(11)(D) demonstrates that 
even a judge who, in analyzing a non-general provision of the Code, professes to be 
strictly adhering to the Code’s mandatory rules of construction, may in fact be 
selectively applying the relevant provision of § 102.
 The Phillips court’s statutory analysis focused on § 522(d)(11)(D)—specifically, 
the clause’s singular-form usage of the words “payment” and “injury,” which the court 
pluralized to “payments” and “injuries.” However, the court seemed to ignore the 
possibility that pluralizing singular-form usages within § 522(d)—“[t]he following 
property may be exempted”—and within § 522(d)(11)—“[t]he debtor’s right to 
receive”—would only deepen the ambiguity observed by other courts considering 
§ 522(d)(11)(D).
 Consider how a universal pluralization of all of the singular-form usages found 
within § 522(d)(11)(D)’s constituent clauses would read: “The following properties 
may be exempted . . . debtors’ rights to receive . . . payments, not to exceed $21,625, on 
account of personal bodily injuries.” This language is susceptible to two interpretations. 
The first is the reading ultimately adopted by the Phillips court: The exemption 
cannot exceed the value of all of the personal-injury-related payments added up 
together. But, with the word “right” pluralized to “rights,” a second plausible 
interpretation emerges: Each debtor enjoys the ability to exempt an unlimited 
number of rights to receive payments, so long as each individual payment is capped 
at the inflation-adjusted amount, no matter how large it may have been when received 
by the debtor prior to the filing of his or her petition. Thus, a non-selective application 
of § 102(7) does nothing to resolve the ambiguity that initially prompted the trustee’s 
challenge to the debtor’s attempts to exempt under § 522(d)(11)(D).139
137. See discussion supra Part II.A.3.
138. See discussion supra Part III.B.3.
139. Does § 102 allow for the sort of selective application of its various codified canons that was apparently 
utilized by the court in Phillips? The answer to that question is unclear; § 102 merely reads “[i]n this 
title” and then sets forth the Code’s various codified canons. 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(11)(D). The lack of 
clarity as to the scope of § 102’s canons means that judges are, on the one hand, obligated to apply the 
Code’s codified canons, but, on the other, given no guidance on how to apply them properly.
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 B. Imagining the Impact of a “Complete” § 102(7)
 As discussed in Part II.A.3.ii, the Code’s drafters had their reasons for leaving 
the plural-includes-the-singular canon out of § 102. Even if the soundness of these 
reasons were challenged, the outcome of that debate would not change the fact that 
the Code’s non-general provisions, and all of the singularized and pluralized language 
therein, were drafted pursuant to the understanding that the singular-includes-the-
plural canon would be the sole number-neutrality canon applicable to the non-general 
provisions. Subjecting the Code’s non-general provisions to the plural-includes-the-
singular canon would only lead to more confusion than § 102(7), as currently worded, 
has already engendered.140
V.  pOssibLE sOLUtiOns tO inCOnsistEnt appLiCatiOns Of thE COdE’s 
COdifiEd CanOns
 There are three categories of possible solutions to the problem presented by 
§ 102(7): (1)  amending the provision to include additional, clarifying language; 
(2) removing the singular-includes-the-plural canon from the Code entirely; and 
(3) reclassifying the singular-includes-the-plural codified canon as an “interpretive 
guideline” rather than a “rule of construction,” and shifting it to a new section of the 
Code, possibly along with other codified canons within § 102 for which such 
relocation would make sense.
 A. Additional Language
 Given its prominent role in jurisdictional splits on the proper interpretation of a 
number of the Code’s provisions, § 102(7)’s brevity is somewhat remarkable, and it 
would be hard to dispute that this statutory provision could stand some additional 
verbiage to help clarify how it should be applied.
 Congress could amend § 102(7) in one of two ways. It could, through analysis at 
the committee level, review the instances in which adherence to § 102(7) (or lack 
thereof) has led to conflicting results and then add to § 102(7) a list of the Code’s 
non-general provisions (possibly of a non-exclusive nature) to which § 102(7) should 
or should not apply.
140. One leading treatise on U.S. bankruptcy law has analyzed the absence of the plural-includes-the-
singular from § 102 by focusing on the plural-form language found in § 303(h)(1) of the Code. See 2 
Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 102.08 (Matthew Bender & Co. 16th ed. 2010) [hereinafter Collier]. 
This provision states that when an involuntary case’s petition is not changed in a timely fashion, the 
court may order relief against the debtor only if “the debtor is generally not paying such debtor’s debts as 
such debts become due.” 11 U.S.C. § 303(h)(1) (emphasis added). Traditionally, the treatise editors note, 
bankruptcy courts required the existence of at least two such debts, but a more recent, seemingly 
pragmatic approach has been to enter an order pursuant to § 303(h)(1) in cases in which a single, large 
debt is not being paid. See Collier, supra, ¶ 102.08 n.4 (comparing Paroline v. Doling, 116 B.R. 583 
(Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1990), with In re Euro-Am. Lodging Corp., 357 B.R. 700 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007)). 
Kenneth Klee criticizes the recent approach as “turn[ing] bankruptcy into a collection device”: state 
courts, he argues, are the appropriate fora for debt-related disputes between two parties. Klee Interview, 
supra note 71.
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 Alternatively, Congress could opt for clarifying language not specific to any 
particular provision within the Code. Outside of the Code, disputes over statutory 
analysis related to singular- and plural-form usages tend to center around what type 
of grammatical article modifies the word at issue.141 Thus, Congress could, for 
example, amend § 102(7) to state that a singular-form noun modified by an indefinite 
article (“a” or “an”) shall have the singular-includes-the-plural canon applied to it.142
 The downside to both of these approaches is that Congress would inevitably have 
to engage in provision-specific analysis of how such amendments to § 102(7) would 
affect outcomes in future legal disputes. For hot-button issues such as the viability of 
tithing by pre-petition debtors, extensive debate would be unavoidable and members 
of Congress may simply decide to let the courts sort out any ambiguity in the 
provisions discussed in Part III.
 B. Removal
 Removing § 102(7) in its entirety would of course solve any analytical quandaries 
stemming from its presence. To the extent that courts struggle to resolve apparent 
ambiguities in the non-general provisions of the Code, they would not be prevented 
from relying on other statutory-analysis methods, such as consulting relevant legislative 
history or the codified-canons provision of Title I of the U.S. Code. Nor would the 
absence of the singular-includes-the-plural canon from the Code prevent judges from 
relying on it in support of a particular interpretation of a disputed Code provision.143
 The problem with removing § 102(7) is that such a maneuver would not aid 
courts in resolving the statutory-analysis quandaries discussed in Part III.B. Once 
again, Congress would either have to specify, on a provision-by-provision basis, why 
it was amending § 102, or risk leaving the courts to struggle with the bankruptcy-
related debates in which § 102(7) has played such a prominent role.
 C. Reclassification
 As discussed in Part II.B.2, semantic canons are properly categorized as canons 
of “interpretation” and not of “construction”—canons of interpretation are best 
described as “rules of thumb” that help guide courts in their statutory analysis, rather 
141. See Sutherland, supra note 52, § 47:34. 
142. According to Kenneth Klee, “when we meant to say ‘one,’ we said ‘one,’” but a singular-form term within 
the Code to which the indefinite article is attached “is subject to the singular-includes-the-plural rule.” 
Klee Interview, supra note 71. Confusion stemming from § 1129(a)(10)’s singular-form definite-article 
reference to “the plan,” discussed in Part III.B.4, would be best resolved by an express (and exclusive) 
choice on the part of Congress in favor of either the “per plan” or the “per debtor” approach. However, 
generalized language in § 102(7) to the effect that the singular-includes-the-plural canon applies 
whenever a singular-form noun is preceded by an indefinite article would prevent quandaries such as the 
one posed by § 548(a)(2)’s reference to “a transfer of a charitable contribution,” discussed in Part III.B.2.
143. As discussed in Part IV.B, with respect to the plural-includes-the-singular canon, and in Part III.A, 
with respect to the generalia specialibus canon, a canon’s absence from the Code’s list of rules of 
construction does not prevent courts from utilizing it in their statutory analysis.
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than mandate a predetermined result, which is the focus of substantive rules of 
construction.
 For this reason, removing the codification of the semantic singular-includes-the-
plural canon from the Code’s list of rules of construction, and reclassifying it under 
the heading of, for example, “guidelines of interpretation,” would be appropriate. In 
addition, including introductory qualifying language in this new section to make 
clear that application of this codified canon should be subordinated to context—
along the lines of the language that exists at the outset of the U.S. Code’s 
codified-canons section—would help courts not particularly familiar with the 
academic study of statutory analysis better appreciate how strongly they should 
adhere to this codified canon of interpretation.
 The arguments underlying the Supreme Court’s ruling in RadLAX seem to 
support such a repurposing—not only for § 102(7), but also for § 102(5) and the 
Code’s other non-bankruptcy-specific codified canons. If these historic principles of 
statutory analysis need not always be strictly applied when context (and other, non-
codified canons) suggest otherwise, then they are properly regarded as guidelines 
that may be helpful in interpreting a particular provision of the Code—and not as 
rules that steer judges toward a result-oriented construction. In contrast, the 
bankruptcy-specific canons of § 102 are properly regarded as outcome-determinative 
directives that deserve the title of “rules of construction.”
 It might be said that such a repurposing would simply pave the way for judges to 
selectively apply non-bankruptcy-specific codified canons so as to cloak with a legal-
rhetoric imprimatur what effectively amounts to legislating from the bench. However, 
the debate over the proper reading of § 1129(b)(2)(A)—and the justices’ conclusive 
position in that debate—shows that the courts already are picking and choosing 
when to strictly follow the Code’s non-bankruptcy-specific codified canons. 
Repurposing these canons as “guidelines of interpretation” would mean that the 
Code merely reflects the prevailing judicial wisdom.
Vi. COnCLUsiOn
 U.S. bankruptcy judges’ inability to arrive at a uniform approach to the application 
of the Code’s singular-includes-the-plural codified canon underscores the lack of 
guidance these jurists face in analyzing the seeming ambiguities in an all-powerful 
statutory scheme. That § 102(7) is not the only non-bankruptcy-specific codified 
canon to have been at the center of a jurisdictional split over how to resolve a 
particular statutory ambiguity within the Code144 suggests that its codified-canon 
sub-framework needs to be overhauled. Reclassifying the Code’s non-bankruptcy-
specific codified canons as interpretive guidelines, and including qualifying language 
144. Compare In re Pac. Lumber Co., 584 F.3d 229, 245–47 (5th Cir. 2009), and In re Phila. Newspapers, 
LLC, 599 F.3d 298, 305 (3d Cir. 2010) (relying on § 102(5)’s “‘or’ is not exclusive” canon to reach a 
strict construction of the cramdown provisions of § 1129(b)(2)), with In re Phila. Newspapers, 599 F.3d 
at 324 (Ambro, J., dissenting), and River Rd. Hotel Partners, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, 651 F.3d 
642, 649 n.5 (7th Cir. 2011) (arguing that the canon codified in § 102(5) should not be rigidly applied 
when analyzing Code provisions).
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explaining that these analytical aids should be subordinated to context—statutory 
changes that could be effectuated through relatively simple amendments not likely to 
trigger an undue amount of legislative controversy—would ensure that the Code’s 
codified-canon sub-framework ref lects the realities of modern statutory analysis. 
Reformulating this foundational aspect of the Code would amount to a first step 
towards fine-tuning the Code to ensure that it prevents confusion—instead of 
fostering it.
